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Abstract 
Empirical studies of the relationship between GDP per capita and country-level CO2 emissions 
tend to focus on the direct effect of per capita GDP growth, rarely taking political institutions 
into consideration. This paper introduces theoretical insights from environmental political 
science research, which suggests that CO2 emissions models would gain explanatory leverage if 
moderators gauging political institutions were considered. We test these theories by estimating 
the potentially moderating effects of democracy, corruption, veto points and players, and civil 
society activity. Our results suggest a positive and linear per capita GDP-CO2 relationship, which 
is barely affected by any variations in political and institutional factors. The only significant 
moderator in our analysis is bicameralism in democratic, low corrupt countries, which generates 
a stronger effect of per capita GDP growth at low levels of GDP per capita. Our analysis thus 
lends rigor to studies in environmental economics that find a positive and linear per capita GDP-
CO2 relationship, and does not provide support for theories common in environmental political 
science research. 
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1. Introduction  
To address the increasingly tangible threats of climate change, researchers seek to identify factors 
that can curb greenhouse gas emissions and particularly carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, which 
are the largest anthropogenic contributor to climate change. Economists often propagate the 
idea that the level of economic development is the strongest driver of CO2 emissions. The 
«environmental Kuznets curve» (EKC) is a fundamental, yet controversial, hypothesis in this 
literature that predicts increased emissions as a consequence of industrialization and intensified 
production, and decreased emissions resulting from sectoral changes towards service and 
knowledge production as well as greener technologies (Panayotou, 1997; Stern, 2002; Tsurumi & 
Managi, 2010). Research in political science, however, claims that the change in countries’ 
emitting behavior can hardly be attributed to economic factors alone. Lowering emissions 
requires environmental policies and is therefore also dependent on political institutions that 
shape policy adoption and implementation (Holmberg & Rothstein, 2012; Immergut & 
Orlowski, 2013; Payne, 1995; Scruggs, 1998, 1999, 2001). The aim of this paper is to test existing 
theories and examine if political and institutional traits moderate the relationship between 
economic development and emissions, such that rich well-governed countries emit less.   
 Theories in environmental political science emphasize a number of factors that affect 
emissions of greenhouse gases through the adoption and implementation of environmental 
policies. Democracy entails freedom of speech, opportunities for wide participation and 
representation, electoral accountability and the active participation of civil society, which it is 
argued pave the way for environmental policies to be placed on the political agenda (Li and 
Revenue 2006). The complexity of decision-making structures within government, defined by 
the number of political actors that have veto power over decision-making, determines how easy 
it is to adopt environmental laws once issues are present on the political agenda (Immergut, 
2010). High corruption and low quality of the public administration responsible for 
implementation of policies is believed to hamper execution of environmental laws and 
regulations and disrupt the positive effect that economic growth and democratization might have 
on the environment (Damania 2002). Environmental political science theories therefore expect 
that political-institutional factors moderate the relationship between per capita GDP growth and 
CO2 emissions by affecting environmental legislation and implementation. However, despite the 
fact that numerous studies consistently theorize such moderation (e.g., Arvin & Lew 2010, 
Spilker 2013), they do not model the interaction empirically and do not apply appropriate 
econometric models to test the relationship. 
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 In this study, we address this research gap and challenge existing environmental political 
science theories by analyzing the per capita GDP-CO2 relationship in interaction with a broad 
spectrum of political-institutional factors using methodologies established in economics. The 
contribution of our study is two-fold. First, we provide a theoretical framework bridging 
economics and environmental political science literatures, which can be useful for further 
research. And, second, our empirical analysis has several methodological advantages compared 
to previous studies on this subject. We analyze the relationship between GDP per capita and 
CO2 emissions using Chudik and Pesaran’s (2015) Dynamic Common Correlated Mean Group 
Estimator (DCCE), which provides a direct estimate of cointegration as well as controls for 
cross-sectional dependency and parameter heterogeneity. The DCCE estimator furthermore 
produces country-specific coefficients, which we then use in a cross-sectional analysis to examine 
linearity and estimate the effect of political and institutional factors on the per capita GDP-CO2 
relationship. 
 The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. We begin with a presentation of 
previous research on the relationship between per capita GDP growth, political institutions and 
CO2 emissions. Thereafter, we describe our methodological and empirical approach, and proceed 
with the presentation of results. Lastly, we summarize our main findings in the concluding 
section, where we also discuss recommendations for policymakers and further research. 
 
2. Theory 
2.1. Environmental economics 
The environmental economic literature typically describes three mechanisms through which per 
capita GDP growth is thought to affect environmental outcomes (e.g., CO2 emissions): changes 
in the «scales», «compositions» and «technologies» of production. Changed scales refer to the fact 
that production is a component in GDP, which implies that increased GDP leads to more 
pollution unless the economy is only progressing in «green» sectors (Blanco et al., 2014; 
Panayotou, 1994). Compositional change implies that agriculture as well as service and 
knowledge production are more environmentally friendly than industrial production and 
manufacturing (Blanco et al., 2014; Panayotou, 1994). Additionally, it is argued that long-term 
increases in GDP per capita cause economies to develop from the primary sector towards 
secondary and tertiary forms of production, which contributes to an inverse U-shaped 
relationship between GDP and environmental degradation (Panayotou, 1994; Syrquin & 
Chenery, 1989). Lastly, technological change occurs if economic profits are used to build a more 
energy efficient or pollution-abating infrastructure, which decreases the amount of pollution per 
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unit of production (unless environmental efficiency is already maximized) (Andreoni & 
Levinson, 2001; Brock & Taylor, 2005).  
 The relative effects of changes in the scale, composition and technology of production 
determine how per capita GDP growth relates to environmental outcomes. Increased GDP per 
capita leads to more pollution if scale change outweighs compositional and technological 
changes. Meanwhile, per capita GDP growth leads to less pollution if technological changes 
outweigh changes in the scale and composition of production, and pollution curbs along an 
inverse U-shaped slope (i.e. an EKC) if the compositional change outweighs changes in the scale 
and technology of production (or if the latter changes balance each other out). In this context, it 
is worth noting that the EKC hypothesis predicts environmental improvement as a happy 
coincidence, or by-product, of economic progress, and therefore does not differentiate between 
environmental substances. Put differently, economic development should predict global 
environmental problems like CO2 emissions equally as well as SO2 emissions, toxic waste, and 
other local environmental problems, if the stylized environmental economic theory is correct.  
 Although this stylized environmental economic theory does not address the role of 
government, it is common to argue that economic progress and environmental quality are linked 
through environmental policy decisions (Arrow et al., 1995; Kijima, Nishide, & Ohyama, 2010; 
Panayotou, 1997; Pasten & Figueroa, 2012). In this perspective, economic progress leads to an 
increased demand for environmental protection, and it provides resources that are necessary to 
feed this demand. There are two main reasons why economic progress is expected to increase 
the demand for environmental protection: First, because economic progress leads to increased 
environmental degradation unless the economy is regulated, and the extent of degradation causes 
more concern about the environment; second, high income generates a sense of material 
satisfaction, which leads to broadened and more altruistic political preferences (this development 
is sometimes labeled as «post-materialistic», see for example  Inglehart & Welzel 2005). 
Politicians are consequently more inclined to pursue environmental policies after a period of 
economic progress, and it is policies that stimulate compositional- and technological change. If 
the effect of GDP per capita on emissions is indeed mediated by policy initiatives, political 
institutions that shape policy adoption and implementation are likely to moderate this effect.1  
 
																																																								
1 Data limitations prevent us from examining the potentially mediating effect of environmental policies, but we 
examine if political-institutional features, which are likely to affect policy decisions and implementation, have an 
impact on the per capita GDP-CO2 relationship. This moderation can only be explained if a sizable portion of the 
relationship is mediated by policy initiatives, and absence of moderation is only plausible if the effect of GDP per 
capita on CO2 emissions is mainly direct. 
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 The following section discusses how the per capita GDP-CO2 relationship might be 
affected by specific political and institutional traits. Before we proceed with this discussion, it is 
however useful to notice that the empirical findings in environmental economic research are 
somewhat inconsistent. Several recent studies report a positive and linear effect of per capita 
GDP growth on CO2 emissions (Berenguer-Rico, 2011; Liddle, 2015; Stern, 2010; Wagner, 2008, 
2015), but a number of studies also find a negative relationship, or that emission levels curb 
along a U-shaped, N-shaped or inverse U-shaped slope as GDP per capita increases (Al-Mulali, 
Saboori, & Ozturk, 2015; Apergis, 2016; Kaika & Zervas, 2013a; Liao & Cao, 2013; Zapata & 
Pandel, 2009). Among the studies that find a positive and linear relationship between GDP per 
capita and CO2 emissions, there is also a considerable variation in the reported effect size. Lack 
of empirical consistency is thus a part of this article’s impetus, and we seek to provide more 
accurate estimates of CO2 emissions by taking political-institutional conditions into account.  
 
2.2. Environmental politics  
The environmental politics literature discusses a large number of factors that may affect 
environmental policy adoption and implementation, and in this article we focus on the most 
prominent ones in the existing research: regime type, quality of institutions, policy 
implementation, complexity of decision-making structures, and the extent of civil society 
participation.2  
 Regime type shapes preference aggregation within a polity and is argued to affect the 
appearance of environmental policies on the political agenda (Li and Revenue 2006). Democracy, 
in particular, opens up opportunities for a wide representation of interests in power structures 
through free and fair elections and enables people to manifest their environmental preferences 
through political initiatives and to demand adoption of environmental policies (Dahl, 1973; 
O'donnell et al., 2004). This regime type furthermore entails free media, which spreads awareness 
about environmental issues among the population and allows citizens to make environmentally 
informed decisions. It also implies freedom of association, allowing civil society groups, 
including environmental non-governmental organizations, to organize and participate in public 
life, lobby their interests, and thus bring environmental issues onto the political agenda. Without 
these liberties, it is implausible that post-material value changes would lead to improved 
environmental outcomes through increasingly stringent environmental policies (Bättig & 																																																								
2 We acknowledge that other political institutions relating to policy diffusion (Holzinger, Knill, & Sommerer, 2008; 
Meseguer, 2004; Simmons & Elkins, 2004; Volden, 2006) and regulatory competitiveness (Holzinger, 2003; 
Holzinger & Sommerer, 2011; Lazer, 2001; Wheeler, 2001) can add to the theoretical framework. Data availability, 
however, prevents us from testing these theories and therefore we do not explicitly address them in this paper. 
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Bernauer, 2009; Li & Reuveny, 2006; Payne, 1995). Additionally, democracy safeguards a 
minimum level of economic redistribution, which facilitates development of post-material values 
through GDP growth (Acemoglu, Naidu, Restrepo, & Robinson, 2013; Inglehart & Welzel, 
2005; Reuveny & Li, 2003; Welzel, 2013). Consequently, environmental political science theories 
imply a moderating effect of democracy on the relationship between economic development and 
emissions (Arvin & Lew, 2009; Spilker, 2013). 
 Although decisions to protect the environment and the presence of appropriate 
environmental policies are necessary for reaching desirable environmental outcomes, they are 
not necessarily sufficient.  This brings us to the discussion of the second mechanism through 
which political institutions may impact environmental outcomes. The causation between policy 
decisions and intended outcomes requires a government that is capable of implementing such 
decisions. One of the most disruptive impediments towards higher government ability to 
implement environmental goals is corruption. Corruption opens up opportunities for public 
officials to enrich themselves instead of pursuing policy goals (Lewis, 2007), which can lead to 
inadequate environmental inspections, underreporting of actual emission levels and stimulate 
incompliance by polluters (Damania, 2002; Wilson & Damania, 2005). Clientelism and nepotism 
in hiring practices lead to lower competence levels among bureaucrats, as well as decreased 
commitments to policy objectives (Lewis, 2007). Thus it is reasonable to expect that incorrupt 
governments facilitate implementation of policy initiatives and help deliver desirable 
environmental outcomes. Existing research suggests that increased corruption is indeed 
associated with higher emissions, even when the level of economic development is accounted for 
(Cole, 2007; Pellegrini & Gerlagh, 2006; Welsch, 2004). However, corruption in itself does not 
generate emissions and we therefore argue that it is more accurate to consider whether 
corruption levels moderate the effect of per capita GDP on CO2 emissions.  
 Existing studies seem to imply that democratic institutions and corruption-free public 
administration provide conditions that are necessary for the adoption and implementation of 
emission reduction policies, arguably constituting the ground pillars for GDP per capita’s 
potential effect on emissions. We therefore expect that higher levels of democracy and freedom 
from corruption will help to transform economic progress into environmental improvement, and 
we examine the following hypothesis to test this claim: 
 
H1: The effect of economic development on CO2 emissions is moderated by levels of democracy and corruption.  
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 In addition to having a democratic and incorrupt government, it is also argued that 
increased participation of civil society moderates the relationship between economic 
development and the environment because environmental groups put additional pressure on 
politicians to adopt environmental policies (Duit, Hall, Mikusinski, & Angelstam, 2009; 
Fukuyama, 2001; Pretty & Ward, 2001; Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1994). Citizens are also 
more likely to adopt egalitarian or altruistic values if they participate in civil society organizations 
(Duit et al., 2009; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Putnam, 2001; Putnam et al., 1994; Welzel, 2013), 
and it is therefore plausible that post-material value creation accelerates faster in highly active 
societies, as per capita GDP grows. The second hypothesis we examine is therefore the 
following: 
 
H2: The effect of economic development on CO2 emissions is moderated by the extent of civil society participation.  
 
 A fourth, potential, mechanism goes though the structural organization of governments, 
which is likely to affect environmental decision-making and policy setting within a polity 
(Immergut, 2010; Lijphart, 1999; Tsebelis, 2002). In particular, it is often argued that policy 
outcomes depend upon the number of institutions that can obstruct the enactment or 
implementation of legislation; namely, the number of veto points and players, such as the 
executive and legislative houses, independent central banks and constitutional courts. Studies in 
environmental politics mention several reasons why increased veto points and players might 
have desirable implications (Jänicke, 2005; Jörgens, Weidner, & Jänicke, 2013; Lijphart, 1999; 
Scruggs, 2001): It paves the way for smaller (i.e. «green») political parties, it increases the 
likelihood of coalition government (i.e. involving smaller parties), and it increases the time 
horizon of policymakers because accountability mechanisms become ambiguous. 
 Yet, some researchers claim that a large number of veto points and players indicates a 
complex and potentially heterogeneous government, which is less likely to reach consensus in 
policy matters (Immergut, 2010; Tsebelis, 2002). Increased numbers of veto points and players 
may therefore deflate the relationship between per capita GDP growth and CO2 emissions, given 
the assumption that much of the GDP-CO2 relationship is mediated by the stringency and extent 
of policy initiatives (Immergut & Orlowski, 2013; Neumayer, 2003). The relationship between 
veto points (and players) and environmental outcomes is, however, yet to be explored with 
appropriate methodologies or in interaction with GDP per capita, and we address this gap by 
examining the following hypothesis:  
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H3: The effect of economic development on CO2 emissions is moderated by the number of veto points and players in 
the structural organization of decision-making.  
 
3. Methods and data 
Our analysis consists of two parts. First, we perform a panel analysis with annual observations of 
128 countries over the time-period 1972-2014, where CO2 emissions is the dependent variable 
and GDP per capita is one of the independent variables.3 Second, we use the country-specific 
coefficients of GDP per capita, obtained in the previous stage, as the dependent variable in a 
cross-country analysis. We avoid using interaction terms in the panel regression because 
traditional solutions to non-stationarity (i.e. differentiation and/or controlling for cross-sectional 
averages) do not apply to interaction terms (Liddle, 2015; Wagner, 2008, 2015).  This strategy 
allows us to examine if the per capita GDP-CO2 relationship is non-linear, moderated by 
political-institutional factors or if it is non-linear under specific political-institutional conditions. 
The sample size is limited to 104 countries in the second (cross-sectional) part of the analysis 
after we remove six outlying countries that have a disproportionate impact on the estimates. 
Another eighteen countries drop out due to data availability. Table 3 in the supplementary 
materials presents an overview of the countries, where bold and underlined names respectively 
denote outliers and dropouts in the cross-sectional analysis. 
 
3.1. Data 
To measure GDP per capita, we apply data from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation 
(IHME) (James, Gubbins, Murray, & Gakidou, 2012). IHME have merged six of the most used 
measures of GDP per capita to create an indicator that covers 210 countries from 1950 to 2015, 
without gaps. None of the original measures cover all countries and time-points, but most 
observations are covered by one or more of the measures. Consequently, it is possible to impute 
most missing values based on growth-rates in the existing time-series. Some observations are 
nevertheless missing in all the original time-series, and IHME relies on «mixed effects models» 
(MEM) to impute missing values in these cases. We, however, exclude all MEM imputations and 
there are three main reasons for this decision: First, we are skeptical of MEM imputations; 
second, our analysis does not require balanced data; and third, we only gain a handful of 
observations by including the MEM imputations.  
 																																																								
3 The sample size is as large as data availability allows. 
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Figure 1. Illustration of original and imputed CO2-measures, using Algeria as example 
 
Note: IMPUTED is a version of the CDIAC measure, where missing values are filled with an imputation procedure 
that is based on the EDGAR measure’s exponential growth rate (see text for further details). We illustrate the data 
with standardized values because CDIAC and EDGAR have different scales.  
Abbreviations: EDGAR= Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Research; CDIAC= Center for Carbon 
Dioxide Emission Analysis 
 
Table 1. Correlation matrix with different measures of CO2 emissions 
        
 
EDGAR CDIAC IMPUTED 
EDGAR 1.0000 
  CDIAC 0.9850 1.0000 
 IMPUTED 0.9850 1.0000 1.0000 
        
Note: IMPUTED is a version of the CDIAC measure, where missing values are filled with an imputation procedure 
based on the EDGAR measure’s exponential growth rate (see text for further details). The correlation tests are 
performed with the extended sample (see explanation in the text).  
Abbreviations: EDGAR= Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Research; CDIAC= Center for Carbon 
Dioxide Emission Analysis 
 
 We construct our dependent variable, CO2 emissions, with data from the Center for 
Carbon Dioxide Emission Analysis (CDIAC) (Boden, Marland, & Andres, 2015) and the 
Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR) (Oliver, Jansens-Maenhout, 
Muntean, & Peters, 2015). We merge these measures with the same initial procedure as the 
IHME uses on GDP per capita: First, we use the EDGAR measure’s exponential growth rate to 
predict the exponential growth rate of the CDIAC measure and second, we use the predicted 
-.2
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values to forecast and backcast the CDIAC measure. Table 1 presents a correlation matrix 
between different measures of CO2 emissions. Figure 1 illustrates the difference between the 
values in the original and imputed measures of CO2 per capita using the example of Algeria. As 
one can tell, CDIAC has missing values at the end of the time-series, and EDGAR has missing 
values at the beginning. This is the case in all countries and it is the reason why we create an 
imputed measure. 
 To measure the level of democracy, corruption and the extent of civil society 
participation, we use data from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (Coppedge et al., 
2016, Pemstein et al. 2015). V-Dem’s index of democracy measures freedom of association and 
expression, the extent to which elections in countries are free and fair, whether suffrage is 
universal, and whether the executive is elected through popular elections or through a popularly 
elected legislature. Their corruption index captures how pervasive political corruption is in the 
public sector, legislature, judiciary, and among the members of the executive. V-Dem’s civil 
society index reports on the “participatory environment for the civil society organizations”, 
which accounts for the number and diversity of civil society organizations present in countries 
and whether it is common for citizens to participate actively in them.  
 We examine institutional arrangements that constitute veto points (i.e. bicameralism) and 
generate veto players (i.e. proportional representation), as well as contexts where veto players are 
“absorbed” (i.e. legislative fractionalization) separately, rather than using a composite measure of 
veto points and players. This allows us to derive a more straightforward interpretation of the 
results and reach more policy relevant conclusions. Proportional representation and 
bicameralism are coded dichotomously, based on legal documents and expert judgment (Cruz, 
Keefer, & Scartascini, 2016; Henisz, 2013). Legislative fractionalization is approximated with a 
formula that calculates the probability that two members in the legislative chamber(s) represent 
different political parties (Henisz, 2013). 
 According to theories in environmental politics and political science, it is very likely that 
the per capita GDP-CO2 relationship is moderated by political-institutional factors. However, it 
is rather problematic to model all political-institutional interactions simultaneously (using the 
cross-sectional design that amends stationarity issues). One would face large problems with 
collinearity and limited degrees of freedom if all variables were included in their original form. 
We therefore model political-institutional moderation with a number of dichotomous constructs 
as follows:  
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• First, we recode the measures of democracy and civil society participation by setting 
above-medium values equal to 1 and below-medium values equal to 0 (by medium, we mean the 
middle of the scale, e.g., 2/4). We demonstrate in the appendix that our results are not very 
sensitive to the «medium-threshold».  
• Second, we recode the corruption-measure by setting below-medium values equal to 1 
and above-mean values equal to 0.  
• Third, we generate country-specific means for each dichotomous variable (i.e. the three 
constructs above, as well as the measures of bicameralism and proportional representation). The 
time range of mean values is restricted to 1972-2014 and each mean value is based on 25 or 
more observations in each country.  
• Fourth, we recode the new, country-specific means by setting values below .75 equal to 
0, and values above .75 equal to 1 (if the original country-specific mean value is above medium). 
Said differently, a “1” indicates that the country has above-medium values of (e.g., democracy) in 
75% or more of the observations, and that the mean value over the whole time period is higher 
than medium. The measure, therefore, captures experience with democracy rather than current 
democracy level. 
• Fifth, we generate composite government indicators by coding countries with a “1” if 
they have a “1” on democracy and corruption, as well as bicameralism, proportional 
representation or civil society.  
• Additionally, to tease out the effect that extraction of oil has on national CO2 emissions, 
we account for the extent of oil production by countries. The measure is taken from the Ross 
Oil and Gas Dataset (2014) and we divide it by population size to derive oil production per 
capita. We also control for the extent of merchandise imports to account for the potential 
impacts of pollution intensive trade. The measure calculates the value of goods received on c.i.f. 
terms from other countries in current US dollars and it is taken from the World Bank (2015). We 
also divide the import measure by population. Lastly, to model the effect of different weather 
conditions and account for some of the unit heterogeneity, we control for countries’ 
geographical position using the data on latitude from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1999) and fill in the missing values using Atlas data. Descriptive statistics are presented 
in Table 4 in the supplementary materials. 
 
3.2. Methods 
In our panel analysis, we use DCCE methodology as suggested by Chudik and Pesaran (2015) to 
estimate error correction (EC) model (see Eq. 1). The DCCE model augments an ordinary EC 
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model by including cross-sectional averages (CAs) and lagged CAs on the right side of the 
equation, and by utilizing a mean group estimator (Eberhardt & Presbitero, 2015). The CAs help 
to account for cross-sectional dependency, while the mean group estimator addresses parameter 
heterogeneity. We examine if our data is marked by cross-sectional dependency, stationarity and 
parameter heterogeneity in the supplementary materials.  
Eq. 1 ∆"#2% = 	( + *+"#2%,+ + *-∆./012% 	+	*3./012%,+ + *4∆565012% 	+	*7565012%,+ + *8∆0#0% 	+	*90#0%,+ + *:YEAR% + *?∆"#2@,%+ *+B∆"#2@,%,+ + *++∆"#2@,%,- + *+-"#2@,%,+ + *+3∆./012@,%+ *+4∆./012@,%,+ + *+7∆./012@,%,- + *+8./012@,%,+ + *+9∆565012@,%+ *+:∆565012@,%,+ + *+?∆565012@,%,- +	*-B565012@,%,+ + *-+∆0#0@,%+ *--∆0#0@,%,+ + *-3∆0#0@,%,- +	*-40#0@,%,+ + C 
 The EC specifications constrain all coefficients of level-variables to equal zero, and 
therefore drop out of the equation, unless they are co-integrated with the dependent variable 
(Söderbom, Teal, Eberhardt, Quinn, & Zeitlin, 2014). This property implies that we can include 
level-variables in the equation without producing spurious regression, which is beneficial because 
it enables us to distinguish between short-term and long-term effects (De Boef & Keele, 2008; 
Eberhardt & Presbitero, 2015). More specifically, we calculate the long-term effect (i.e. «long-run 
multiplier» (LRM)) by dividing the respective lagged-level variable-coefficients with the negative 
value of the error correction term (e.g., *:/−*+, Eq. 1), while the coefficients of differenced 
variables (e.g., *9, Eq. 1) are interpreted as short-run effects. 
 The LRM calculation can be performed with country-specific coefficients, which 
produces an average long-run (ALR) coefficient, but it can also be calculated with panel-average 
coefficients, in which case the LRM is called the long-run average (LRA) coefficient. We 
calculate the standard errors and corresponding significance statistics of LRAs with the delta 
method, and use Pesaran’s (1995) non-parametric method for the ALRs. These coefficients can 
differ, and we present them both to assemble a complete picture. 
 Since the DCCE estimator is heterogeneous, we can calculate panel-average LRMs in 
two ways (Eberhardt & Presbitero, 2015). On the one hand, we can calculate the LRM in each 
respective country and then take the average of country-specific LRMs, in which case the panel-
average LRM is labeled as an «average long-run» (ALR) coefficient. On the other hand, we can 
take the average of country-specific EC terms and lagged level coefficients, and use these 
averages to generate a so-called «long-run average» (LRA) coefficient. It is theoretically possible 
to get significantly different ALR and LRA coefficients, which is why we present both variants in 
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our analysis. Moreover, we calculate ALR and LRA coefficients with robust means to weigh 
down outliers.    
 Kapetanios, Pesaran, and Yamagata (2011) argue that CAs account for non-stationarity, 
and therefore, as the model already includes CAs, it is not necessary to apply EC specifications 
to avoid spurious regression. Chudik and Pesaran (2015), however, point out that the DCCE 
estimator has a more relaxed exogeneity assumption than the CCE estimator. More specifically, 
the DCCE estimator allows for feedback effects between the independent variables, whereas the 
CCE estimator requires strict exogeneity. The DCCE model also enables us to make direct 
inferences about individual time series and panel-average cointegration, by examining the 
significance of the EC term, and there are consequently both methodological and practical 
reasons to add dynamic specifications (and lagged CAs) to the CCE model. 
 The heterogeneous aspect of the DCCE model enables us to examine non-linearity and 
conditionality with an alternative approach. Non-linearity is usually examined with a polynomial 
equation, in which the relevant variable is raised to a number of powers (i.e. GDPpc2, GDPpc3 
etc.), but this practice is problematic since differencing does not make higher power-variables 
stationary (Liddle, 2015; Wagner, 2008). To get around this issue, we examine the potential non-
linearity of GDPpc’s effect on CO2 emissions by regressing country-specific LRM coefficients of 
GDPpc against country-specific mean values of GDPpc. We also use this approach to examine if 
political-institutional features moderate the GDPpc-CO2 relationship, and tests of linearity and 
moderation constitute the second stage of our analysis. 
 We divide the cross-sectional analysis into a series of models due to multicollinearity. 
First, we study how the mean level of GDP per capita and each of the political-institutional 
indicators affect the GDP-CO2 relationship, and then we examine if the mean value of GDP per 
capita and political-institutional indicators affect the GDP-CO2 relationship in conjunction. To 
provide reliable cross-sectional estimates, we use robust regression to identify outliers (we 
consider observations with lower weights than 0.1 outliers), and apply Huber and White’s (1967) 
method to calculate heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. To examine if the residuals possess 
skewness and/or kurtosis, we apply D’Agostino, Belanger and D’Agostino Jr.’s (1980) test, and 
complement our main findings with graphical illustrations of residual distributions (see Figure 3 
in the Supplementary materials).  
Eq. 2 FG5(./012) = ( + *+(./012) + *-(.#J_/") + *3(./012 ∗ .#J_/") + *4(FMN)+ *7(#0G#/12) + C 
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 Equation 3 presents an example of the models in our cross-sectional analysis. The 
equation has two control variables, oil production per capita (OPRODpc) and latitude (LAT), as 
well as the product and constituent variables of GDP per capita (GDPpc) and incorrupt 
democracy (GOV_DC). By estimating this model, we examine if the extent of non-linearity in 
the GDPpc-CO2 relationship depends on the presence of an incorrupt and democratic 
government. 
 
4. Results 
Table 2 presents panel-average coefficients, confidence intervals and regression diagnostics from 
four models, which are arranged from left to right according to efficiency. 
 
Table 2. Panel-average estimates 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
  MG DMG CCE DCCE 
     EC 
 
-.456*** 
 
-.902*** 
  
[-.493 -.420] 
 
[-.951 -.852] 
GDPpc .552*** .620*** .483*** .480*** 
 
[.406 .698] [.414 .827] [.369 .597] [.294 .666] 
POP 1.148*** 1.237*** 1.357*** 1.053** 
 
[.619 .677] [.679 1.795] [.756 1.957] [.190 1.917] 
MIMPpc .046*** .007 .077*** .059*** 
 
[.020 .071] [-.033 .047] [.050 .104] [.016 .101] 
Trend -.0053954 -.009 -.022*** -.024*** 
 
[-.015 .004] [-.021 .002] [-.036 -.007] [-.041 -.006] 
Constant -14.841*** -15.771*** -21.903*** -12.509 
 
[-23.690 -5.991] [-25.187 -6.355] [-34.586 -9.219] [-28.428 3.409] 
     CD 34.49*** 21.94*** 0.41 -0.14 
PUR -23.869*** -63.059*** -40.946*** -75.309*** 
RMSE .110 .075 .084 .043 
Countries 128 128 128 128 
Time-range 1972-2014 1972-2014 1972-2014 1972-2014 
N 5422 5422 5422 5422 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note: A) The dependent variable is CO2-emissions; B) 95% confidence intervals in parentheses (calculated with 
non-parametric standard errors, following Pesaran and Smith (1995)); C) Other variables from the analysis are 
included in the estimating equations but omitted from the table (i.e. cross-sectional averages (all models) and first-
differenced and lagged level variables (Model 2 and 4)).  
Abbreviations: MG= Mean group estimator; MG-ECM= Dynamic mean group estimator; CCE= Common 
correlated effects estimator; DCCE= Dynamic common correlated effects estimator; EC= Error correction term; 
POP= Population; MIMPpc= Merchandise imports per capita; PUR= Panel unit root test; CD= Cross-sectional 
dependency test; RMSE= Root mean squared error. 
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 Model 4 is the DCCE model that we discuss in the methods section, and the remaining 
models are included to illustrate the necessity of DCCE estimation. The results show that 
different models do not produce significantly different GDPpc coefficients. This finding is 
somewhat unexpected, as Models 1 and 2 fail to produce cross-sectional independent residuals. 
The residuals in each model are, furthermore, stationary, which implies panel-average 
cointegration, and there are consequently no great differences in the panel-average results. 
However, since we use the country-specific coefficients in the second stage of our analysis, it is 
useful to consider if they are also unaffected by changes in the model specifications and choice 
of estimator (we only consider the country-specific coefficients in Models 3 and 4 as Models 1 
and 2 fail to produce independent residuals). 
 
Table 3. Description of country-specific LRM coefficients for GDP per capita (from 
Model 3 and 4) 
  Unrestricted Cointegration 
  CCE DCCE CCE DCCE 
     Lowest value -1.224 -9.111 -1.224 -3.517 
Highest value 5.230 24.596 5.230 6.449 
     Mean .555*** .719*** .552*** .578*** 
Std. Err .072 .240 .075 .135 
95% CI (lower) .412 .243 .402 .309 
95% CI (upper) .698 1.195 .702 .847 
     Robust mean .483*** .480*** .471*** .444*** 
Std. Err .058 .094 .059 .093 
95% CI (lower) .368 .292 .353 .258 
95% CI (upper) .598 .668 .590 .629 
     Correlation 0.4190 0.6550 
N 128 120 
          
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note: A) The CCE columns describe country-specific beta coefficients, which are estimated with Model 3; B) The 
DCCE columns describe country-specific LRM coefficients, which are calculated with estimates from Model 4; C) 
The cointegration columns represent a subsample of countries where there the error correction term in Model 4 has 
a lower t-score than 2 (i.e. 120 countries where there is significant evidence of cointegration); D) The unrestricted 
columns represent the full sample; E) The correlation coefficients represent the correlation between country-specific 
GDPpc coefficients that are estimated with the CCE and DCCE.  
 
 Table 3 and Figure 2 show that the underlying country-specific coefficients in Models 3 
and 4 are dissimilar, even though their mean values cannot be distinguished with statistical 
confidence. If the coefficients were identical, we should see a diagonal line of dots from the 
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bottom left corner to the top right corner in Figure 2, as well as a 1.0-correlation in Table 3. 
Instead, the scatter-plot looks more like a vertical line and the correlation is 0.42. Another 
indication of dissimilarity is the difference between the lowest CCE coefficient (-1.224) and the 
lowest DCCE coefficient (-9.111), as well as the difference between the highest CCE coefficient 
(5.230) and the highest DCCE coefficient (24.596). 
 
Figure 2. Scatter plot of country-specific LRM coefficients for GDP per capita (from 
Model 3 and 4) 
 
Note: A) The DCCE estimates represent beta coefficients that are estimated with Model 4, and the CCE estimates 
represent LRM coefficients that are estimated with Model 3; B) The right-hand panel only includes countries where 
the error correction term in Model 4 has a lower t-score than 2 (i.e. 120 countries where there is significant evidence 
of cointegration); C) The left-hand panel includes all 128 countries. 
 
 One reason why the country-specific coefficients differ is that the EC term is non-
significant in eight countries (i.e. there is no evidence of cointegration), and the DCCE 
coefficient is therefore invalid in these countries. These countries are removed from the sample 
that we use to calculate the statistics of the two far-right columns in Table 3, as well as the right-
hand panel in Figure 2. As a consequence, the correlation between CCE and DCCE coefficients 
increases and the scatter plot becomes more diagonal, but it is still far from perfect. The 
remaining lack of correlation is likely due to the fact that the CCE and DCCE estimators have 
different exogeneity assumptions. 
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Table 4. Description of modified country-specific LRM coefficients for GDP per capita 
(based on Model 4) 
                
Mean .542*** 
 
Robust mean .403*** 
 
Lowest value -3.517 
Std. Err .127 
 
Std. Err .085 
 
Highest value 6.449 
95% CI (lower) .289 
 
95% CI (lower) .234 
 
N 128 
95% CI (upper) .795 
 
95% CI (upper) .572 
                   
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Figure 3. Scatter-plot of original and modified, country-specific, LRM coefficients for 
GDP per capita (based on Model 4) 
 
Note: A) The estimates represent country-specific LRM coefficients that are calculated with estimates from Model 4; 
B) The «modification» is explained in the text.  
 
 We base the second stage of our analysis on the DCCE coefficients because they are 
estimated with more realistic exogeneity assumptions than the CCE coefficients. The DCCE 
coefficients are replaced with zero in the eight countries where there is no evidence of 
cointegration. The dependent variable in our next analyses is thus a modified set of DCCE 
coefficients. Descriptive statistics and a comparison with the original DCCE coefficients are 
displayed in Table 4 and Figure 3 respectively.   
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Table 5. Cross-sectional estimates 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
       GDPpc -0.000899 0.0165 -0.0181 -0.00407 -0.0199 -0.0184    
 
[-0.0230,0.0212] [-0.0275,0.0605] [-0.0500,0.0138] [-0.0308,0.0226] [-0.0494,0.00960] [-0.0463,0.00950]    
GDPpc2 
 
-0.000471 
    
  
[-0.00162,0.000676] 
    GOV_DC 
  
0.580 
   
   
[-0.194,1.354] 
   GOV_DCP 
   
0.154 
  
    
[-0.402,0.710] 
  GOV_DCB 
    
0.883*** 
 
     
[0.297,1.468] 
 GOV_DCC 
     
0.629*   
      
[-0.118,1.375]    
LEGFRAC 
    
0.151 
 
     
[-0.821,1.124] 
 OPRODpc -0.0100 -0.000534 0.00526 -0.00743 0.0181 -0.00101    
 
[-0.0500,0.0299] [-0.0495,0.0484] [-0.0370,0.0476] [-0.0490,0.0341] [-0.0283,0.0645] [-0.0405,0.0385]    
LATITUDE -0.00449 -0.00558 -0.00587 -0.00499 -0.00179 -0.00381    
 
[-0.0180,0.00901] [-0.0186,0.00741] [-0.0195,0.00776] [-0.0185,0.00852] [-0.0161,0.0126] [-0.0172,0.00959]    
Constant 0.543*** 0.521*** 0.557*** 0.550*** 0.437 0.546*** 
 
[0.222,0.864] [0.183,0.860] [0.234,0.880] [0.227,0.872] [-0.158,1.031] [0.225,0.868]    
       N 103 103 103 103 103 103 
R2 0.0110 0.0153 0.0353 0.0134 0.0813 0.0382   
RMSE .84983 .85232 .84361 .85312 .82747 .84234 
SK-test 3.05 3.18 2.53 3.28 3.54 1.99 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note: A) The dependent variable is a modified set of DCCE coefficients. The coefficients are estimated with Model 4 (Table 2), and the modification is explained in the text; B) 
95%-confidence intervals in brackets.  
Abbreviations: GOV_DC= Democratic and incorrupt government; GOV_DCP= Democratic incorrupt government with proportional representation; GOV_DCB= Democratic, 
incorrupt and bicameral government; GOV_DCC= Democratic and incorrupt government with a vibrant civil society; OPRODpc= oil production per capita; LEGFRAC= 
legislative fractionalization; SK-test= Skewness and kurtosis-test for normality.  
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 In Table 5, we examine if the GDPpc-CO2 relationship depends on how rich a country is 
or the type of government characteristics it has. Results from Models 1 and 2 suggest that the 
GDPpc-CO2 relationship is linear, while results from Model 3 imply that the GDPpc-CO2 
relationship is not moderated by the presence of incorrupt and democratic government. Model 4 
adds proportional representation to the list of political-institutional indicators, and it does not 
report significant moderation. Model 5 suggests that an increase in GDP per capita is associated 
with higher CO2 emissions in countries that have incorrupt, democratic and bicameral 
government institutions. Lastly, findings in Model 6 show that the GDPpc-CO2 relationship is 
not significantly different in countries with incorrupt, democratic government and a vibrant civil 
society, compared to other states.  
 The supplementary materials include robustness tests where we respectively modify the 
analyses in Table 5 in five different ways: 1) Include outliers in the sample; 2) Use lower 
threshold in the coding of institutional dummies; 3) Use higher threshold in the coding of 
institutional dummies; 4) Use CCE estimates as the dependent variable; 5) Use the original 
DCCE estimates as the dependent variable. The robustness tests find a weaker evidence of non-
linearity under incorrupt, democratic and bicameral government, and some evidence of non-
linearity under incorrupt and democratic regime with a vibrant civil society. It is also clear that 
the alternative operationalization of the dependent variable with CCE estimates impacts the 
results. 
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Table 6. Cross-sectional estimates, continued 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
     GDPpc 0.0161 0.00446 -0.00515 0.000974    
 
[-0.0465,0.0786] [-0.0266,0.0355] [-0.0357,0.0254] [-0.0216,0.0235]    
GOV_DC 0.781* 
   
 
[-0.106,1.669] 
   GOV_DC*GDPpc -0.0371 
   
 
[-0.103,0.0284] 
   GOV_DCP 
 
0.446 
  
  
[-0.332,1.225] 
  GOV_DCP*GDPpc 
 
-0.0178 
  
  
[-0.0561,0.0205] 
  GOV_DCB 
  
1.786*** 
 
   
[0.891,2.681] 
 GOV_DCB*GDPpc 
  
-0.0431** 
 
   
[-0.0815,-0.00466] 
 GOV_DCC 
   
1.228**  
    
[0.174,2.282]    
GOV_DCC*GDPpc 
   
-0.0371*   
    
[-0.0755,0.00135]    
LEGFRAC 
  
-0.0183 
 
   
[-1.030,0.993] 
 OPRODpc 0.00251 -0.00208 0.00115 0.0111    
 
[-0.0375,0.0425] [-0.0433,0.0391] [-0.0427,0.0450] [-0.0292,0.0513]    
LATITUDE -0.00798 -0.00628 -0.00539 -0.00580    
 
[-0.0213,0.00537] [-0.0197,0.00714] [-0.0202,0.00943] [-0.0189,0.00726]    
Constant 0.523*** 0.539*** 0.523* 0.514*** 
 
[0.185,0.861] [0.213,0.866] [-0.0866,1.132] [0.189,0.840]    
     N 103 103 103 103 
R2 0.0439 0.0204 0.113 0.0593    
RMSE .84415 .85445 .8173 .83731 
SK-test 2.53 3.39 3.90 2.49 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note: A) The dependent variable is a modified set of DCCE coefficients. The coefficients are estimated with Model 
4 (Table 2), and the modification is explained in the text; B) 95%-confidence intervals in brackets.  
Abbreviations: GOV_DC= Democratic and incorrupt government; GOV_DCP= Democratic incorrupt 
government with proportional representation; GOV_DCB= Democratic, incorrupt and bicameral government; 
GOV_DCC= Democratic and incorrupt government with a vibrant civil society; OPRODpc= oil production per 
capita; LEGFRAC= legislative fractionalization; SK-test= Skewness and kurtosis-test for normality.  
 
 In Table 6, we examine if the linearity of the GDP per capita’s effect on CO2 emissions is 
moderated by the presence or absence of different political institutions. Model 1 suggests that 
incorrupt and democratic government does not moderate the GDPpc-CO2 relationship. In 
Model 2, we add proportional representation to the government indicator, but this does not seem 
to make the GDPpc-CO2 relationship less linear. Model 3 suggests that the GDPpc-CO2 
relationship is slightly less linear in countries with incorrupt, democratic and bicameral 
governments. Lastly, Model 4 suggests that the GDPpc-CO2 relationship is no more or less linear 
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in countries with incorrupt democratic governments with a vibrant civil society, compared to 
other countries. We continue to examine these effects in Figures 4, 5 and 6. 
 
Figure 4. Marginal effects 
 
Note: The left-hand panel displays the marginal effect of GOV_DC*GDPpc, which is estimated in Model 1 (Table 
6). The right-hand panel displays the marginal effect of GOV_DCP*GDPpc, which is estimated in Model 2 (Table 
6).  
Abbreviations: GOV_DC= Democratic and incorrupt government; GOV_DCP= Democratic, incorrupt 
government with proportional representation. 
 
Figure 5. Marginal effects, continued 
 
Note: The left-hand panel displays the marginal effect of GOV_DCB*GDPpc, which is estimated in Model 3 (Table 
6). The right-hand panel displays the marginal effect of GOV_DCC*GDPpc, which is estimated in Model 4 (Table 
6).  
Abbreviations: GOV_DCB= Democratic, incorrupt and bicameral government; GOV_DCC= Incorrupt democratic 
government with a vibrant civil society. 
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 The illustrations in Figures 4-5 show that GOV_DCB has the highest intercept and the 
steepest slope, and it is the only condition that can be distinguished from the alternative with the 
95% confidence. These findings suggest that poor countries with incorrupt, democratic and 
bicameral governments have a worse starting point than the other countries, but they produce a 
similar GDPpc-CO2 relationship as the rest of the world when the level of GDPpc becomes 
sufficiently high (around $20,000). In Figure 6, we illustrate the per capita GDP-CO2 relationship 
in each of the GOV_DCB-countries, and find that Jamaica, Spain and India drive the interaction 
effect (i.e. these are the only GOV_DCB-countries with sufficiently low GDP per capita). 
Among these three countries, India has particularly high CO2 emissions and low GDPpc levels, 
and therefore has a large impact on the interaction coefficient. This result is somewhat consistent 
with theories that predict adverse effects of increased numbers of veto points, but it is 
unexpected to find that the effect diminishes as GDP per capita increases. We therefore 
encourage further research to examine why per capita GDP growth is associated with relatively 
higher emissions in poor countries with democratic, incorrupt and bicameral government; with a 
particular focus on whether it is indeed caused by bicameralism. 
 
Figure 6. Fractional-polynomial & scatter plot of GDP per capita and CO2 emissions in 
GOV_DCB-countries 
 
Note: A fractional-polynomial & scatter plot of GDP per capita and CO2 emissions is included in the appendix, 
where USA and China are included. These countries are left out of Figure 6 for illustrative purposes. 
Abbreviations: GOV_DCB= Democratic, incorrupt and bicameral government. 
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5. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper has been to investigate if political institutional arrangements can address 
one of the biggest environmental challenges of today – excessive emissions of carbon dioxide, 
which is largely driven by economic growth and contributes greatly to global warming. The paper 
takes its point of departure from a critical review of research in environmental economics and 
politics and is motivated by the shortcomings found in both strands of literature. The 
environmental economics literature provides rigorous tests and explanations of the per capita 
GDP-CO2 relationship, but it typically fails to incorporate relevant political-institutional factors 
in the discussion on income and emissions. Meanwhile, research in environmental political 
science discusses factors that may moderate the relationship between economic growth and 
emissions, but it typically fails to examine interactions between political institutions and 
economic growth using modern econometric methods.  
 This paper bridges the two literatures and provides a thorough examination of the 
relationship between countries’ economic, political and emitting behavior by analyzing CO2 
emissions in 128 countries over the time-period 1974-2014. In particular, we investigate if the 
relationship between GDP per capita and CO2 emissions is curvilinear and/or moderated by 
non-economic factors. Our specific focus is on political and institutional factors that the existing 
literature expects to affect the adoption and implementation of environmental policies: the extent 
of democracy, corruption, civil society participation, and the number of veto points and players.  
 Our analysis does not provide support to the EKC hypothesis, which predicts an inverse 
U-shaped relationship between GDP per capita and CO2 emissions. Instead, our results lend 
support to recent studies by Wagner (2008, 2015), Liddle (2015) and others who find a positive 
and linear per capita GDP-CO2 relationship. Our estimates indicate that a 1-dollar increase in 
GDP per capita is associated with a 493-717 metric ton increase in CO2 emissions regardless of 
how rich a country is. These values denote the exponent of the lower and upper confidence 
interval in the far-right column of Table 3. The confidence interval of our per capita GDP 
coefficient is slightly lower than in Wagner and Liddle’s studies, and the reason is probably that 
we have a larger sample size and more appropriate control variables that are relevant for 
explaining CO2 emissions. Consequently, we argue that our estimate is more accurate and that 
previous studies overestimate the positive impact of per capita GDP growth on CO2 emissions.  
 Although we find a slightly lower coefficient than the studies that we cite, it is not 
controversial to find a positive and linear effect from an environmental economics perspective. 
Several environmental economic theorists suggest a more complex and policy-induced 
relationship than the EKC implies (Kaika & Zervas, 2013a, 2013b; Kijima et al., 2010; Pasten & 
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Figueroa, 2012). What might seem surprising, however, is that the results of this study do not 
support that variations in government capacity moderate the relationship between per capita 
GDP growth and CO2 emissions. Based on common theoretical perceptions within the literature, 
we expected to find a negative or inverse U-shaped per capita GDP-CO2 relationship in countries 
that have favorable political and institutional conditions. The results, however, indicate that none 
of our political or institutional factors, be it democracy, lack of corruption, high extent of civil 
society participation or veto points and players moderate GDP per capita’s effect on CO2 
emissions in the expected direction. The positive and linear per capita GDP-CO2 relationship is 
in other words highly robust, and the lack of significant moderation indicates that outlying cases 
of negative or inverse U-shaped effect are most likely not driven by free and fair elections, high 
corruption control, civil society activity or certain decision-making structures.  
 One reason for the lack of effect from political-institutional factors could be that the 
political processes in countries that have been successful in reducing CO2 emissions have not yet 
contributed enough to the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions to make a significant difference 
when compared to the rest of the world. Another reason could be that the efforts to reduce CO2 
emissions are quite recent and the positive effect of political institutions to secure these efforts is 
not yet sufficiently pronounced to establish a significant difference over time. Further research 
should therefore continue to investigate if and how political institutions affect the relationship 
between economic growth and emissions as efforts to reduce carbon dioxide continue and time 
series become more extensive.  
 The practical implication of our study is that policymakers need to come up with more 
stringent policy initiatives and more effective implementation strategies in order to alleviate the 
adverse impact per capita GDP growth has on polluting behavior. If existing initiatives were 
sufficiently stringent and effective, we should have found a weaker per capita GDP-CO2 
relationship in countries with higher government capacity.  
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Supplementary Materials 
In these supplementary materials, we perform pre-analysis diagnostic tests to discuss the practical 
statistical implications of parameter heterogeneity, cross-sectional dependency and unit roots. We 
also include a brief note to describe some details regarding Chudik and Pesaran’s (2015) estimator 
and include supplementary figures and tables, which we refer to in the text. 
 
Parameter heterogeneity 
Figure 1. Quadratic-polynomial plot 
 
Note: The slopes in Figure 1 are estimated with the following country-specific OLS regression: !"2$ = & +()(+,-./)$ + (1(+,-./1)$ + 2.  
 
 Figure 1 illustrates the country-specific relationships between GDP per capita and CO2 
emissions. The illustration should be interpreted with caution as the underlying regressions are 
based on a simple methodology, but we use it nevertheless to get an impression of the extent of 
parameter homogeneity. The figure shows a positive tendency in the data: higher levels of GDP 
per capita tend to associate with higher levels of CO2 emissions, regardless of the data source. 
The intercept and shape of each slope, however, seems to vary greatly. Some countries have high 
CO2 emissions even at low levels of GDP per capita, while the GDP-CO2 relationship is U-
shaped in some countries and inverse-U shaped in others. We are therefore likely to get 
misguided results if we constrain all countries by the same intercept and functional form (Müller-
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Fürstenberger & Wagner, 2007; Pesaran, 2006). For this reason, we use a heterogeneous 
estimator and examine linearity with an alternative routine, which we described in the main text. 
 
Cross-sectional dependency 
Eq. 1 134(45)) 67,949:7;)45)7:)   
 
Table 1. Cross-sectional dependency 
CO2 GDPpc POP MIMPpc 
    296.47*** 218.46*** 508.39*** 445.11*** 
        
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note: The test is performed with Pesaran’s methodology (see Eq. 1). 
 
 Cross-sectional dependency (CD) refers to correlation between the country-specific 
residuals in a heterogeneous panel analysis (Pesaran, 2007). High CD-statistics are problematic 
because they imply heteroscedasticity, which makes standard errors and significance testing 
unreliable. One way to examine if CD is a potential problem is to examine the extent to which 
respective variables correlate across countries. Table 1 presents CD-statistics for all the variables 
in our analysis and residual CD-statistics are presented later on, along with the results. The CD-
test is performed with Pesaran’s (2007) methodology, which collects the pair-wise correlation 
coefficients of variables (or residuals) in each country (67,9)  and determines the «typical» 
correlation coefficient with Eq. 1.4 The results in Table 1 suggest that all variables in our dataset 
are strongly correlated across countries, and we therefore expect that CD will be an issue in our 
analysis. To amend this problem, we account for «common factors», which are described more 
closely in the main text. 
 
Stationarity 
Unit root variables are non-stationary and do not revert towards a mean value if there is a shock 
in the time-series, which causes spurious regression unless it is treated appropriately. Unit root 
variables need to be differentiated to become stationary, and they are integrated in a certain 
order, depending on the amount of differentiation that is required to make the variable 																																																								
4 When the panel is unbalanced, Pesaran’s (2004) CD-test takes the following form: 134(45)) 67,949:7;)45)7:)  
	 35 
stationary, i.e. a variable is integrated in the first order, I(1), if it becomes stationary by first-
difference. To determine if we need to difference our data, and to what extent it is necessary to 
difference it, we perform Pesaran’s (2007) panel unit root test. This test emanates from Dickey 
and Fuller (1979), as well as Im, Pesaran and Shin’s (2003) unit root tests. Dickey and Fuller 
(1979) examine unit roots by examining if () in the following equation is statistically significant:  
 
Eq. 2 ∆=7,$ = & + ()(=7,$) + 2 
 
 It is also possible to add lags of the dependent variable to the equation above, in which 
case it becomes the «augmented Dickey-Fuller test». Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) add another 
augmentation to Dickey and Fuller’s test, as it calculates the equation with Pesaran’s (1995) mean 
group estimator. Pesaran’s (2007) PUR test is often called «CIPS», since it augments Im, Pesaran 
and Shin’s (IPS) approach with accounts for a common factor (i.e. cross-sectional dependency). 
More specifically, CIPS accounts for cross-sectional averages of each parameter, as well as lags of 
differenced regressors, and the following equation illustrates CIPS with two lags of the 
dependent variable: 
 
Eq. 3 ∆=$ 	= 	& + ()=$5) + (1∆=$5) + (?=@,$5) + (A∆=$51 + (B∆=@,$51 + 2 
 
 CIPS solves Eq. 3 with a heterogeneous estimator, which means that a regression analysis 
is performed in each country and the presence of unit roots is evaluated with the average t-score 
(or «t-bar») of  () . 5  The t-bar is calculated non-parametrically, following Eq. 4, and it is 
interpreted according to the critical values that are listed in Pesaran (1995).6  
 
Eq. 4 
( 1D(D − 1) (F@ − F47:) )1)			 
 																																																								
5 We follow the common practice (e.g., Liddle 2015) and transform all variables in our panel analysis with a natural 
logarithm. 
6 In equation (1), N represents the number of countries, F@indicates country-specific coefficients and F represents 
the coefficient of the cross-sectional mean. 
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Table 2. Panel unit root tests 
  CO2 ∆CO2 
  w/o trend w/trend w/o trend w/trend 
0 lags -2.853*** 2.181 -47.03*** -45.902*** 
1 lag -1.924** 4.424 -31.344*** -29.222*** 
2 lags -.914 6.034 -18.809*** -15.97*** 
3 lags -1.762** 5.548 -11.847*** -9.059*** 
4 lags .114 7.827 -5.785*** -2.265** 
  GDPpc ∆GDPpc 
  w/o trend w/trend w/o trend w/trend 
0 lags 6.161 -.264 -34.631*** -32.546*** 
1 lag 2.974 -4.961*** -27.076*** -24.428*** 
2 lags 3.597 -1.733** -16.352*** -13.504*** 
3 lags 1.734 -3.747*** -12.908*** -10.232*** 
4 lags 3.972 -1.099 -8.641*** -5.669*** 
  POP ∆POP 
  w/o trend w/trend w/o trend w/trend 
0 lags 10.285 14.005 -1.824** 5.594 
1 lag -16.64*** -17.087*** -26.317*** -30.615*** 
2 lags 8.693 13.763 -1.173 3.636 
3 lags -2.431*** -4.617*** -6.412*** -4.373*** 
4 lags 4.454 4.415 -4.785*** -1.015 
  MIMPpc ∆MIMPpc 
  w/o trend w/trend w/o trend w/trend 
0 lags -1.15 -3.318*** -45.597*** -43.761*** 
1 lag -1.493* -2.805*** -32.945*** -29.72*** 
2 lags -.257 -.719 -21.676*** -18.179*** 
3 lags -.304 -1.24 -15.587*** -12.701*** 
4 lags .952 1.796 -11.054*** -7.409*** 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Abbreviations: POP= population; MIMPpc= merchandise trade per capita.  
 
 The results in Table 2 indicate that we should treat the remaining variables as non-
stationary unless they are first-differenced. Some statistics suggest that POP needs to be 
differenced more than once to become stationary, and it is therefore necessary to examine if the 
residual in our regression model is non-stationary before we interpret the coefficients. The results 
for GDPpc and MIMPpc differ greatly depending on whether the test accounts for a linear time-
trend or not. More specifically, the variables appear to be non-stationary when the trend is 
omitted, whereas several tests suggest stationarity when the trend is included. Consequently, the 
tests suggest that we include a linear time-trend in our regression model to account for the 
possibility that GDPpc and MIMPpc are trend-stationary. 
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Notes regarding the «Dynamic Common Correlated Mean Group Effects» 
estimator 
Other popular estimators, such as the first-difference model and the error correction model, do 
not address cross-sectional dependency and they are therefore inappropriate. The fixed effects 
model addresses neither non-stationarity nor cross-sectional dependency (Chudik & Pesaran, 
2015; Eberhardt & Presbitero, 2015; Liddle, 2015; Pesaran, 2006; Söderbom et al., 2014). 
 Following Chudik and Pesaran (2015), we augment the regression model with a number 
of cross-sectional averages that equals the number of annual observations per country, raised to a 
third power: INT(T1/3). 
 The mean group estimator calculates ordinary least square estimates in each of the panel’s 
time series and examines if the mean of the time-series estimates is statistically significant. The 
significance test is performed with non-parametric standard errors and Pesaran’s (2006) critical 
values. The non-parametric standard errors of the estimate are calculated with the following 
equation: ( )4(45)) (F@ − F47:) )1)			 
 In practice, we calculate panel-mean coefficients and p-values by collecting the time-series 
coefficients of each variable and regressing them against an intercept. We use robust regression in 
this procedure to account for outlying time-series estimates. 
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A list of supplementary figures and tables 
Figure 2. Residual diagnostics for Model 3 in Table 2 
 
 
Figure 3. Fractional-polynomial and scatter plot of GDP per capita and CO2 emissions 
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Table 3. List of countries in the panel analysis 
        
Afghanistan Djibouti Korea, South Poland 
Algeria Dominican Rep. Kuwait Portugal 
Angola Ecuador Laos Qatar 
Argentina Egypt Lebanon Romania 
Australia El Salvador Lesotho Rwanda 
Austria Ethiopia (1993-) Liberia Saudi Arabia 
Bahrain Fiji Libya Senegal 
Bangladesh Finland Madagascar Sierra Leone 
Belgium France (1963-) Malawi Singapore 
Benin Gabon Malaysia (1966-) South Africa 
Bhutan Gambia Mali Spain 
Bolivia Ghana Mauritania Sri Lanka 
Botswana Greece Mauritius Sudan  
Brazil Guatemala Mexico Swaziland 
Bulgaria Guinea Mongolia Sweden 
Burkina Faso Guinea-Bissau Morocco Switzerland 
Burundi Guyana Mozambique Syria 
Cambodia Haiti Myanmar Tanzania 
Cameroon Honduras Nepal Thailand 
Canada Hungary Netherlands Togo 
CAF India New Zealand Trinidad and Tobago 
Chad Indonesia Nicaragua Tunisia 
Chile Iran Niger Turkey 
China Iraq Nigeria Uganda 
Colombia Ireland Norway United Arab Emirates 
Congo Israel Oman United Kingdom 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Italy Pakistan (1971-) United States 
Costa Rica Jamaica Panama Uruguay 
Cote d'Ivoire Japan Papua New Guinea Venezuela 
Cuba Jordan Paraguay Vietnam 
Cyprus (1975-) Kenya Peru Zambia 
Denmark Korea, North Philippines Zimbabwe 
        
Note: Table 1 contains all countries in the panel analysis-sample. Countries in bold are omitted from the cross-
sectional analysis because of their extreme values. Underlined countries are omitted from the cross-sectional analysis 
because of data limitations. 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      CO2 5422 9.533923 2.292206 3.610918 16.17076 
GDPpc 5422 7.719854 1.67706 4.447695 11.3638 
POP 5422 16.13885 1.513881 11.86436 21.03389 
MIMPpc 5422 6.113554 1.809105 .2968567 11.17715 
ESITMATE 104 .5613372 1.083944 -2.580812 4.391585 
GDPpc 104 7333.582 11533.41 143.8117 49580.05 
OPRODpc 104 .6876586 2.295179 0 18.23284 
LAT 104 23.50962 16.35409 0 60 
LEGFRAC 104 .4566616 .215694 0 .8608026 
GOV_DC 104 .2403846 .4293864 0 1 
GOV_DCP 104 .1826923 .3882853 0 1 
GOV_DCB 104 .1057692 .3090313 0 1 
GOV_DCC 104 .2403846 .4293864 0 1 
      
Note: The first four variables listed consist of panel data (T: 1972-2014) and the remaining variables consist of cross-
sectional data (i.e. cross-sectional averages for the time-period 1972-2014). The panel data-variables are expressed as 
logarithms and the cross-sectional variables are expressed in their original values, as they are in the analyses. 
Abbreviations: POP= Population; MIMPpc= Merchandise imports per capita; ESTIMATE= the country-specific 
long-run multipliers of GDPpc, which are estimated in the panel analysis; GOV_DC= Democratic and incorrupt 
government; GOV_DCP= Democratic and incorrupt government with proportional representation; GOV_DCB= 
Democratic, incorrupt and bicameral government; GOV_DCC= Democratic and incorrupt government with a 
vibrant civil society; OPRODpc= oil production per capita; LEGFRAC= legislative fractionalization. 
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Table 5. Cross-sectional estimates with outliers included 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
     GDPpc -0.00280 0.00397 -0.0141 -0.00489    
 
[-0.0863,0.0807] [-0.0330,0.0410] [-0.0530,0.0249] [-0.0387,0.0289]    
GOV_DC 1.089* 
   
 
[-0.161,2.340] 
   GOV_DC*GDPpc -0.0278 
   
 
[-0.115,0.0596] 
   GOV_DCP 
 
0.962 
  
  
[-0.446,2.370] 
  GOV_DCP*GDPpc 
 
-0.0298 
  
  
[-0.0833,0.0236] 
  GOV_DCB 
  
1.473*** 
 
   
[0.437,2.509] 
 GOV_DCB*GDPpc 
  
-0.0333 
 
   
[-0.0778,0.0112] 
 GOV_DCC 
   
1.747**  
    
[0.280,3.214]    
GOV_DCC*GDPpc 
   
-0.0460*   
    
[-0.0993,0.00723]    
LEGFRAC 
  
0.679 
 
   
[-0.623,1.981] 
 OPRODpc -0.00501 -0.0108 -0.00988 0.00269    
 
[-0.0579,0.0479] [-0.0645,0.0429] [-0.0662,0.0465] [-0.0550,0.0603]    
LATITUDE -0.0153 -0.0153 -0.0111 -0.0124    
 
[-0.0358,0.00516] [-0.0357,0.00515] [-0.0315,0.00923] [-0.0311,0.00632]    
Constant 0.894*** 0.902*** 0.603* 0.848*** 
 
[0.389,1.399] [0.414,1.390] [-0.0767,1.283] [0.367,1.329]    
     N 110 110 110 110 
R2 0.0608 0.0492 0.0698 0.0820    
RMSE 1.2703 1.2782 1.2704 1.2559 
SK-test 32.43*** 31.78*** 33.09*** 33.00*** 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note: A) The dependent variable is a modified set of DCCE coefficients. The coefficients are estimated with Model 
4 (Table 2), and the modification is explained in the text; B) 95%-confidence intervals in brackets.  
Abbreviations: GOV_DC= Democratic and incorrupt government; GOV_DCP= Democratic incorrupt 
government with proportional representation; GOV_DCB= Democratic, incorrupt and bicameral government; 
GOV_DCC= Democratic and incorrupt government with a vibrant civil society; OPRODpc= oil production per 
capita; LEGFRAC= legislative fractionalization; SK-test= Skewness and kurtosis-test for normality.  
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Table 6. Cross-sectional estimates with lower threshold on institutional variables 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
     GDPpc 0.0343 0.00505 0.00211 0.00454    
 
[-0.0683,0.137] [-0.0244,0.0344] [-0.0247,0.0289] [-0.0196,0.0287]    
GOV_DC 0.475 
   
 
[-0.198,1.148] 
   GOV_DC*GDPpc -0.0429 
   
 
[-0.145,0.0589] 
   GOV_DCP 
 
0.0845 
  
  
[-0.482,0.651] 
  GOV_DCP*GDPpc 
 
-0.00842 
  
  
[-0.0412,0.0243] 
  GOV_DCB 
  
1.330*** 
 
   
[0.564,2.095] 
 GOV_DCB*GDPpc 
  
-0.0254 
 
   
[-0.0589,0.00813] 
 GOV_DCC 
   
0.973**  
    
[0.221,1.725]    
GOV_DCC*GDPpc 
   
-0.0274*   
    
[-0.0592,0.00435]    
LEGFRAC 
  
-0.231 
 
   
[-1.240,0.778] 
 OPRODpc -0.00309 -0.00578 -0.00209 0.00650    
 
[-0.0278,0.0216] [-0.0308,0.0193] [-0.0253,0.0211] [-0.0184,0.0314]    
LATITUDE -0.00849 -0.00503 -0.0101 -0.00837    
 
[-0.0228,0.00579] [-0.0187,0.00868] [-0.0257,0.00558] [-0.0220,0.00522]    
Constant 0.508*** 0.534*** 0.642** 0.535*** 
 
[0.134,0.883] [0.212,0.855] [0.0396,1.245] [0.214,0.856]    
     N 103 103 103 103 
R2 0.0317 0.0139 0.126 0.0647    
RMSE .8495 .85728 .81141 .83492 
SK-test 2.66 2.99 3.74 3.01 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note: A) The dependent variable is a modified set of DCCE coefficients. The coefficients are estimated with Model 
4 (Table 2), and the modification is explained in the text; B) 95%-confidence intervals in brackets; C) A government 
is considered democratic if the country has a higher score than 0.55 (instead of 0.5), incorrupt if the country has a 
lower score than 0.45 (instead of 0.5), and a civil society is considered vibrant if the country has a higher score than 
1.4 (instead of 1.5) (see variable description in the text). 
Abbreviations: GOV_DC= Democratic and incorrupt government; GOV_DCP= Democratic incorrupt 
government with proportional representation; GOV_DCB= Democratic, incorrupt and bicameral government; 
GOV_DCC= Democratic and incorrupt government with a vibrant civil society; OPRODpc= oil production per 
capita; LEGFRAC= legislative fractionalization; SK-test= Skewness and kurtosis-test for normality.  
  
	 43 
Table 7. Cross-sectional estimates with higher government-threshold 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
     GDPpc 0.0251 0.00506 0.00300 0.00350    
 
[-0.0702,0.120] [-0.0244,0.0345] [-0.0238,0.0298] [-0.0182,0.0252]    
GOV_DC 0.569 
   
 
[-0.180,1.319] 
   GOV_DC*GDPpc -0.0362 
   
 
[-0.131,0.0587] 
   GOV_DCP 
 
0.139 
  
  
[-0.503,0.782] 
  GOV_DCP*GDPpc 
 
-0.00957 
  
  
[-0.0435,0.0244] 
  GOV_DCB 
  
1.503*** 
 
   
[0.733,2.272] 
 GOV_DCB*GDPpc 
  
-0.0306* 
 
   
[-0.0641,0.00297] 
 GOV_DCC 
   
1.081*** 
    
[0.381,1.782]    
GOV_DCC*GDPpc 
   
-0.0296**  
    
[-0.0584,-0.000766]    
LEGFRAC 
  
-0.181 
 
   
[-1.173,0.811] 
 OPRODpc -0.000561 -0.00493 -0.00289 0.00547    
 
[-0.0251,0.0240] [-0.0304,0.0205] [-0.0261,0.0203] [-0.0200,0.0309]    
LATITUDE -0.00901 -0.00539 -0.0114 -0.00706    
 
[-0.0234,0.00542] [-0.0192,0.00843] [-0.0272,0.00445] [-0.0201,0.00599]    
Constant 0.525*** 0.536*** 0.649** 0.545*** 
 
[0.154,0.896] [0.215,0.858] [0.0472,1.251] [0.222,0.868]    
     N 103 103 103 103 
R2 0.0363 0.0143 0.132 0.0391    
RMSE .84749 .85711 .80855 .84627 
SK-test 2.54 3.03 3.83 3.99 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note: A) The dependent variable is a modified set of DCCE coefficients. The coefficients are estimated with Model 
4 (Table 2), and the modification is explained in the text; B) 95%-confidence intervals in brackets; C) A government 
is considered democratic if the country has a higher score than 0.45 (instead of 0.5), incorrupt if the country has a 
lower score than 0.55 (instead of 0.5), and a civil society is considered vibrant if the country has a higher score than 
1.6 (instead of 1.5) (see variable description in the text). 
Abbreviations: GOV_DC= Democratic and incorrupt government; GOV_DCP= Democratic incorrupt 
government with proportional representation; GOV_DCB= Democratic, incorrupt and bicameral government; 
GOV_DCC= Democratic and incorrupt government with a vibrant civil society; OPRODpc= oil production per 
capita; LEGFRAC= legislative fractionalization; SK-test= Skewness and kurtosis-test for normality.  
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Table 8. Cross-sectional estimates with CCE estimates as the dependent variable 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
     GDPpc 0.0338 0.0162** -0.00899 0.00342    
 
[-0.0159,0.0835] [0.000689,0.0317] [-0.0311,0.0131] [-0.0278,0.0347]    
GOV_DC 0.894*** 
   
 
[0.364,1.424] 
   GOV_DC*GDPpc -0.0567** 
   
 
[-0.106,-0.00699] 
   GOV_DCP 
 
0.776** 
  
  
[0.179,1.372] 
  GOV_DCP*GDPpc 
 
-0.0406*** 
  
  
[-0.0645,-0.0166] 
  GOV_DCB 
  
0.759** 
 
   
[0.0628,1.456] 
 GOV_DCB*GDPpc 
  
-0.0163 
 
   
[-0.0447,0.0122] 
 GOV_DCC 
   
0.918**  
    
[0.211,1.625]    
GOV_DCC*GDPpc 
   
-0.0309*   
    
[-0.0667,0.00491]    
ABS 
  
0.424 
 
   
[-0.301,1.150] 
 OPRODpc 0.0256 0.0284 0.0244 0.0312*   
 
[-0.00991,0.0611] [-0.00593,0.0628] [-0.0131,0.0619] [-0.000677,0.0630]    
LATITUDE -0.00666 -0.00547 -0.00193 -0.00334    
 
[-0.0167,0.00334] [-0.0151,0.00418] [-0.0118,0.00791] [-0.0130,0.00635]    
Constant 0.530*** 0.551*** 0.389** 0.540*** 
 
[0.301,0.758] [0.324,0.778] [0.0258,0.753] [0.311,0.770]    
     N 108 108 108 108 
R2 0.0920 0.0773 0.0551 0.0644    
RMSE .62906 .63416 .64489 .63856 
SK-test 0.90 1.37 0.93 0.68 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note: A) The dependent variable is a set of CCE estimates that is estimated with Model 3 (Table 2); B) 95%-
confidence intervals in brackets; C) Outliers excluded: Benin and Spain. 
Abbreviations: GOV_DC= Democratic and incorrupt government; GOV_DCP= Democratic incorrupt 
government with proportional representation; GOV_DCB= Democratic, incorrupt and bicameral government; 
GOV_DCC= Democratic and incorrupt government with a vibrant civil society; OPRODpc= oil production per 
capita; LEGFRAC= legislative fractionalization; SK-test= Skewness and kurtosis-test for normality.  
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Table 9. Cross-sectional estimates with the original DCCE estimates as dependent 
variable 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
     GDPpc 0.0254 0.0246 -0.00393 0.0192    
 
[-0.0480,0.0987] [-0.0134,0.0626] [-0.0398,0.0319] [-0.0208,0.0592]    
GOV_DC 0.999** 
   
 
[0.0765,1.921] 
   GOV_DC*GDPpc -0.0429 
   
 
[-0.116,0.0306] 
   GOV_DCP 
 
0.731 
  
  
[-0.166,1.628] 
  GOV_DCP*GDPpc 
 
-0.0382* 
  
  
[-0.0825,0.00617] 
  GOV_DCB 
  
1.751*** 
 
   
[0.684,2.818] 
 GOV_DCB*GDPpc 
  
-0.0390 
 
   
[-0.0860,0.00801] 
 GOV_DCC 
   
1.270**  
    
[0.193,2.348]    
GOV_DCC*GDPpc 
   
-0.0474*   
    
[-0.0961,0.00130]    
ABS 
  
0.456 
 
   
[-0.810,1.721] 
 OPRODpc -0.0125 -0.0162 -0.00933 -0.00672    
 
[-0.0581,0.0332] [-0.0619,0.0295] [-0.0611,0.0425] [-0.0531,0.0396]    
LATITUDE -0.0137* -0.0125* -0.00909 -0.0114    
 
[-0.0290,0.00154] [-0.0273,0.00233] [-0.0247,0.00656] [-0.0260,0.00328]    
Constant 0.688*** 0.690*** 0.488 0.669*** 
 
[0.314,1.062] [0.328,1.052] [-0.159,1.135] [0.309,1.029]    
     N 104 104 104 104 
R2 0.0493 0.0354 0.0936 0.0482    
RMSE 1.0155 1.0229 .99664 1.016 
SK-test 4.40 4.32 5.47* 4.49 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note: A) The dependent variable is a set of DCCE estimates that is estimated with Model 4 (Table 2); B) 95%-
confidence intervals in brackets; C) Outliers excluded: Benin, China, Congo, Costa Rica, Nepal and Zambia. 
Abbreviations: GOV_DC= Democratic and incorrupt government; GOV_DCP= Democratic incorrupt 
government with proportional representation; GOV_DCB= Democratic, incorrupt and bicameral government; 
GOV_DCC= Democratic and incorrupt government with a vibrant civil society; OPRODpc= oil production per 
capita; LEGFRAC= legislative fractionalization; SK-test= Skewness and kurtosis-test for normality.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
